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The CEDAW Convention, which was adopted in 1979, recognizes a wide range of 
rights for women regarding non-discrimination and the eradication of gender 
violence. Together with CEDAW, its Committee and the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women make sure that the scope of protection available to women 
at the normative level (de jure) is wide. However, when analyzing the enforcement 
mechanisms of CEDAW, which are the reporting procedure, the interstate 
procedure, the inquiry procedure and the individual complaints procedure, 
notorious limits of enforcement emerge (de facto). In addition, arguments such as 
the public/private divide or cultural relativism constitute further impediments for 
women in order to achieve full equality. Given these constraints, this paper 
develops four proposals that would contribute towards the goal of implementation. 
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The end of the Second World War led to the establishment of the United Nations 
(UN) by the UN Charter1, which is considered a milestone treaty in the history of 
human rights. It was signed the 26th of June 1945 and its Preamble set out the 
determination ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women’2. Gender 
equality was one of the goals of the UN and further agreements were reached in the 
following years, including the Convention on the Political Rights of Women in 
19523. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW or the 
Convention)4 and women’s rights were recognized as human rights internationally5. 
This treaty led to additional developments, but there is still so much to be done in 
this regard. Full equality between men and women is not yet a reality, and gross 
violations of women’s rights on account of their gender continue to occur in the 
modern world6. 
The main objective of this research is to reach a conclusion on whether the rights 
set forth in CEDAW (de jure) are effectively implemented in practice (de facto). A 
well-founded answer can only be reached through a critical analysis of the legal 
framework at the international level regarding the rights of women. References to 
relevant case law and secondary sources such as books or journal articles will be 
equally necessary. At last, if the final answer is affirmative, it will mean that there 
has been an effective transition between recognition and enjoyment of women’s 
rights. Conversely, if the answer is negative, new and effective methods will be 
required in order to achieve the goal of full gender equality in the near future. 
                                                          
1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
2 Ibid, preamble. 
3 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 20 December 1952, 
A/RES/640 (VII). 
4 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180. 
5 Indhrani Sridharan ‘Practising Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective’ (Oxford University Press 
India 2002) 93.  




To provide a proper insight of the issue, this essay will focus on gender violence 
and its link with discrimination with reference to the work of CEDAW, its 
Committee, and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women. It will also 
address the enforcement mechanisms available and their real effectiveness, the 
public/private divide, and the due diligence standard. References to the reservations 
to the CEDAW, often justified by cultural relativism arguments, will also be useful 
in order to determine whether the existing legal framework is effectively 
implemented or not. 
After the analysis exposed in the previous paragraph, and anticipating now that 
there are multiple gaps regarding implementation of CEDAW, four proposals for 
ensuring de facto enjoyment of women’s rights will be developed. All of them deal 
with an increased coordination among the relevant actors that have the duty to 
implement the Convention.  
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I. CEDAW, THE COMMITTEE, AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR 
CEDAW was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. It is one of the most 
widely ratified human rights conventions with 189 States parties, after its recent 
adoption by South Sudan in 20157. Its 16 substantive articles recognize civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights for women, and are a response to the 
necessity to establish a broader view of equality which would eradicate 
discrimination in the family, in the community and in the workplace, and the 
survival stereotypes and traditional practices detrimental to women8. 
Article 17 CEDAW establishes the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), which is the body that 
monitors the implementation of the Convention. It consists of 23 independent 
experts who are elected for a term of four years by the States parties9. Among its 
functions, the CEDAW Committee elaborates General Recommendations, with the 
purpose of aiding States parties in understanding their obligations under CEDAW 
in relation to specific aspects of it10. At this point, General Recommendation No. 
19 is of special interest, because it defines gender-based violence as a form of 
discrimination11, stating that there is a ‘close connection between discrimination 
against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’12. Consequently, article 1 CEDAW, which sets out the 
definition of discrimination, must be interpreted as including gender violence; 
meaning that it is possible to breach some provisions of the Convention regardless 
of whether they mention violence or not13. 
                                                          
7 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx> accessed 20 January 2018. 
8 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 22, Discrimination against 
Women: The Convention and the Committee, 25 June 1993, A/CONF. 157/24 Part I, chap. III, 1. 
9 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Mandate.aspx> accessed 20 January 2018. 
10 CEDAW see note 4, art. 21. 
11 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 19: Violence against women, 11th Session, 1992, CEDAW/C/GC/19, para. 1. 
12 Ibid, para. 4. 
13 Ibid, paras. 6 and 7. 
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In 1994, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women14. The current Special Rapporteur is Dr. Dubravka 
Šimonović, who is requested to: seek and receive information on violence against 
women from different bodies; recommend measures at all levels to eliminate 
violence against women; work closely with the Human Rights Council, the treaty 
bodies, and the Commission on the Status of Women; and adopt a universal 
approach to the elimination of violence against women15. 
CEDAW, its Committee, and the Special Rapporteur show that the scope of the 
protection of women from violence at the normative level (de jure) is wide, and 
provides appropriate tools to make sure that full equality between men and women 
is achieved. However, the question which now arises is whether the existing laws 
and standards are effectively implemented in practice (de facto).  
                                                          
14 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1994/45, 4 March 1994, 3. 
15 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website 




II. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
There are four enforcement mechanisms for the Convention: The reporting 
procedure, the interstate procedure, the inquiry procedure and the individual 
complaints procedure. 
The reporting procedure is the only compulsory mechanism, and it requires that 
States must submit an initial report within one year after the entry into force of 
CEDAW for the State concerned16 and thereafter periodic reports at least every four 
years17 showing the level of implementation of their obligations under the 
Convention. After that, the Committee will make its concluding observations, 
where it presents the positive aspects but also the areas of concern and 
recommendations for the State concerned18. The value of this mechanism is that 
States parties get actively involved in the Convention, and that they are required to 
show a certain degree of accountability. Nevertheless, in practice, this system is not 
satisfactory, as ‘reports are often delayed, outdated, and ineffective in their 
exposition of steps undertaken to eliminate de facto discrimination against 
women’19. 
The case of India is an example of the lack of effectiveness of the reporting 
procedure. CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations on India’s initial report 
in 2000, show that although India recognized a fundamental right to gender equality 
and a specific enabling provision on affirmative action in its Constitution20, the high 
incidence of gender-based violence against women was a major obstacle to the 
implementation of the Convention21. The Concluding Observations on India’s third 
report in 2007 were not much different, as it expressed that the State party was not 
                                                          
16 CEDAW see note 4, art. 18.1.(a). 
17 CEDAW see note 4, art. 18.1.(b). 
18 Smith see note 6, 76. 
19 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson Education 
Limited, 2003) 365. 
20 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: India, June 2000, 
CEDAW/C/IND/CO/1, para. 45. 
21 Ibid, paras. 52 and 68. 
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taking active steps to address the issue of gender-based violence22, and that a full 
and effective implementation of the Convention was indispensable23. Finally, the 
Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth reports of India in 2014, 
reiterated many of the concerns and recommendations of the concluding comments 
adopted in 2007, such as the need to ensure that rape crimes are not committed with 
impunity24. As a result, it can be argued that the reporting procedure does not 
provide proper solutions in practice (de facto). 
The interstate procedure is established by article 29 CEDAW. It allows States to 
complain about the failure by another State to comply with its obligations under the 
Convention, by referring a case to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice 
25. However, this enforcement mechanism can be opted-out by reservation when 
ratifying the Convention26, and has never been used as it is considered not sensible 
diplomatic practice. 
The next two enforcement mechanisms are provided by the CEDAW Optional 
Protocol27, which was adopted in 1999 and entered into force in 2000; it has been 
ratified by 109 States. The inquiry procedure28 enables one or more of the members 
of the Committee to visit a State party to the Optional Protocol to investigate a 
possible violation of the Convention. Nevertheless, the State party has to give its 
consent, the investigation must be instigated by a third party such as a Non-
governmental organization (NGO), and it is possible to opt-out of this procedure29. 
Its effectiveness is proved by the fact that it has only been used once in relation to 
                                                          
22 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: India  ¸ 2 February 2007, 
CEDAW/C/IND/CO/3, paras. 8 and 9. 
23 Ibid, para. 63. 
24 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: India, 24 July 2014, 
CEDAW/C/IND/CO/4-5, para. 10(a). 
25 CEDAW see note 4, art. 29.1. 
26 Ibid, art. 29.2. 
27 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 6 October 1999, A/RES/54/4. 
28 Ibid, arts. 8 and 9. 
29 Ibid, art. 10. 
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Mexico, as a consequence for the abduction, rape and murder of women in Ciudad 
Juárez30. 
The second mechanism included in the Optional Protocol is the individual 
complaints procedure, which permits individuals or groups of individuals claiming 
to be victims of a violation of any of the rights of the Convention, to submit a 
communication to the Committee31. Among its requirements, the State concerned 
must be party to the Convention as well as to the Optional Protocol32, and all 
domestic remedies must have been exhausted33. According to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) jurisprudence 
database, the Committee has adopted views on 25 cases since the Optional Protocol 
entered into force; these concern different countries like Austria, Brazil, Georgia, 
Peru, Philippines, Spain or Turkey, among others34. Despite this fact, some authors 
suggest that ‘the number of violations founded (…) do not reflect the infractions 
which undoubtedly occur’35. This underutilization of the individual complaints 
system could be caused by the lack of awareness of this mechanism by the victims 
or their relatives. 
The analysis set out above indicates the existing limits of the scope of protection 
available to women. In fact, these significant weaknesses of enforcement, are the 
reason why women do not always enjoy protection in practice (de facto).  
                                                          
30 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Report on Mexico produced 
by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico, 27 January 2005, 
C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO. 
31 CEDAW Optional Protocol see note 27, art. 2. 
32 Ibid, art. 3. 
33 Ibid, art. 4. 
34 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights jurisprudence database 
<www.juris.ohchr.org/search/results> accessed 21 January 2018. 
35 Smith see note 6, 77. 
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III. PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE AND THE DUE DILIGENCE 
STANDARD 
Classical international law theory is based on the separation between the public and 
the private spheres. While the public sphere is associated with the government and 
the economy, the private sphere contains the family and the relations between 
private individuals36. According to this distinction, when ‘the pater familias closes 
the door on his private family, (…) the State closes its gates to international scrutiny 
of its domestic affairs’37. 
In contrast, General Recommendation No. 19, defines gender-based violence as: 
‘Violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, 
threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty’38. 
This definition suggests that gender violence can be exercised in both the public 
and the private sphere, i.e. either ‘within the family or domestic unit or within any 
other interpersonal relationship, (…) or by the State or its agents’39. In this respect, 
it has been argued that the public/private dichotomy was just a fictional construction 
made by the State to preserve its sovereignty from Public International Law40. 
Accordingly, article 2 CEDAW imposes a list of obligations on States that go 
beyond the public sphere. In particular, it requires States to: 
‘Take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise’41. 
This provision not only breaks with the traditional distinction between the public 
and the private sphere, but also obliges States to take active steps to implement the 
                                                          
36 Rachael Lorna Johnstone, ‘Unlikely bedfellows: feminist theory and the war on terror’ (2009) 9 
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, 4. 
37 Ibid, 6. 
38 CEDAW General Recommendation 19 see note 11, para. 6. 
39 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 28: Core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention, 47th Session, 2010, 
CEDAW/C/GC/28, para. 19. 
40 Christine Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’ (1999) European Journal of 
International Law 389-395.  
41 CEDAW see note 4, art. 2(e) (emphasis added). 
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Convention. As General Recommendation No. 28 states, ‘article 2 is not limited to 
the prohibition of discrimination against women caused directly or indirectly by 
States parties, [it] also imposes a due diligence obligation on States parties to 
prevent discrimination by private actors’42. Therefore, States must implement 
regulations in areas such as education, employment, banking or housing43; as well 
as prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish any act of gender-based violence44. 
Despite the clarity of that statement, there are still some countries that seem 
reluctant to adopt appropriate legislation to regulate the domestic sphere. For 
instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not consider marital rape a 
prosecutable offense45. In fact, this was recently reported by the Committee in its 
Concluding Observations on the combined sixth and seventh reports of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this document, the Committee pointed out 
the ‘lack of legal provisions prohibiting domestic violence (…), and the absence of 
shelters, counselling and rehabilitation services for victims of such violence’46. 
Consequently, it urged the State party to prohibit domestic violence, including 
marital rape, and to provide for adequate sanctions47. 
All States parties to CEDAW have a duty to take positive action to address violence 
against women48; this is what is known as the ‘due diligence standard’. As a general 
rule, the concept of ‘due diligence’ entails four categories: ‘prevent, investigate, 
punish and provide compensation’49. The first time this concept was adopted was 
in the Velásquez-Rodríguez Case50, where the Inter-American Court of Human 
                                                          
42 CEDAW General Recommendation 28 see note 39, para. 13. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, para. 19. 
45 Amber Peterman, ‘Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2011) 101(6) American Journal of Public Health 1060-1067. 
46 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 30 July 2013, CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7, para. 21(c). 
47 Ibid, para. 22(e). 
48 Stephanie Farrior, ‘The Due Diligence Standard and Violence against Women’ (2004) 14(4) 
Interights Bulletin 150. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras [1988] IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 4. 
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Rights found Honduras responsible for Velasquez’s disappearance as well as for 
the lack of punishment imposed on the perpetrators of his abduction and murder51.  
The Angela González Carreño v Spain Case52 can be analyzed as an example case 
regarding the relationship between domestic violence and the due diligence 
standard. This involved an individual complaint submitted to the CEDAW 
Committee. The author of the communication was a Spanish woman who was 
subjected to physical and psychological violence by her ex-husband (F.R.C.), 
during and after the marriage. A visiting regime let F.R.C. see their daughter 
(Andrea), who was under 18 and continuously rejected to spend time with her 
father. Despite the fact that the author filled more than 30 complaints, F.R.C. was 
only convicted once with a fine of 45 euros. On 24 April 2013, after a judicial 
hearing about the use of the family residence, F.R.C. told the author that he was 
going to ‘take away what mattered most to her’. The next day, during one of the 
visits with his daughter, F.R.C. shot Andrea and then committed suicide. After these 
facts, no compensation was given to the author although she filed many claims53. 
In the Consideration of the Merits, the Committee found that Spain had infringed 
the rights of the author and her deceased daughter under the Convention54. It also 
recommended the State party to strengthen the application of the legal framework, 
and to provide mandatory training for judges and administrative personnel ‘to 
ensure that the competent authorities exercise due diligence to respond 
appropriately to situations of domestic violence’55. 
The situation set out above could have been avoided if the State party had provided 
an effective remedy when the author made the first complaints; this is one of the 
measures that the General Recommendation No. 28 highlights to ‘ensure the 
practical realization of the elimination of discrimination against women and 
                                                          
51 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of 
Violence against Women, 20 January 2006, E/CN.4/2006/61, para. 20. 
52 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Communication no. 
47/2012: decision adopted by the Committee at its 58st session, 20 June-18 July 2014, 15 August 
2014, CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012. 
53 Ibid, paras. 2.1 – 2.21. 
54 Ibid, para. 10. 
55 Ibid, para. 11(b)(ii) and 11(b)(iii). 
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women’s equality with men’56. Some States are characterized by the lack of 
efficiency of their national tribunals and other public institutions, often with less 
personnel than required and a lot of work accumulated due to the insufficiency of 
economic resources. However, ‘the cry of inadequate resources is not a valid 
response to claims of a failure to exercise due diligence to address violence against 
women’57. In other words, a State that does not allocate enough resources to address 
the problem of gender violence is in effect perpetuating it58.  
                                                          
56 CEDAW General Recommendation 28 see note 39, para. 36. 




IV. RESERVATIONS AND THE CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
ARGUMENT 
Reservations are defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a 
unilateral statement made by a State when ratifying a treaty, which purports to 
exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State59. Any reservation incompatible with the object and 
purpose of a treaty is not allowed60. In the case of CEDAW over 50 countries have 
made reservations, a fact that places it as the UN human rights treaty with the largest 
number of reservations61. 
Some of these reservations are made to article 5 CEDAW, although it is considered 
to be one of the core provisions of the Convention together with article 2. Under 
article 5, States are required to implement changes to social and cultural practices 
when these ‘are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’62, as well as to recognize ‘the 
common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of 
their children’63. For instance, New Zealand and Niger have made reservations to 
article 5(a) on the basis of contradiction with existing customs and practices64. This 
is what is known as the cultural relativism argument. 
Cultural relativism is a major factor in states’ unwillingness to fully implement the 
Convention. It means that where international human rights norms are in conflict 
with traditional standards or practices, culture must take precedence over universal 
                                                          
59 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, art. 2(1)(d). 
60 Ibid, art. 19(c). 
61 Marijke De Pauw, ‘Women’s rights: from bad to worse? Assessing the evolution of incompatible 
reservations to the CEDAW Convention’ (2013) 29(77) Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law 51. 
62 CEDAW see note 4, art. 5(a). 
63 Ibid, art. 5(b). 
64 Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by New Zealand (Bayefsky 
database) <www.bayefsky.com/pdf/newzealand_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018; 
Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by Niger (Bayefsky database) 
<www.bayefsky.com/pdf/niger_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018. 
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norms65. This argument has usually been used as an excuse to allow for practices 
that violate women’s rights66 and constitute a form of domestic violence67, such as 
female genital mutilation68, honour killings (killings of women by male members 
of a family regarded as a rite of passage into manhood)69, or witch hunting (killings 
motivated by a belief in superstition and evil spirit of women)70. 
A State example in this regard is the case of Egypt; where culture is used as a 
justification for harmful traditional practices and violence against women71, 
including honour killings, marital rape72, and female genital mutilation73. 
Additionally, despite the wrongfulness of such acts, the State party has made a 
general reservation to article 2 CEDAW, whereby any contradiction between the 
Convention and the Islamic Sharia’s provisions will give preference to the latter74, 
in order to make sure no responsibilities arise for such practices. However, this 
reservation should be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention75; an opinion which was also expressed by Germany and the 
Netherlands in their objections made upon ratification of CEDAW76. In particular, 
Germany stated that the reservation ‘may not be invoked in support of a legal 
practice which does not pay due regard to the legal status afforded to women and 
                                                          
65 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences on the intersections between culture and violence against women, 17 
January 2007, A/HRC/4/34, para. 42. 
66 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its causes and Consequences on the cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women, 
31 January 2002, E/CN.4/2002/83, para. 1. 
67 Ibid, executive summary para. 1. 
68 Ibid, paras. 12-20. 
69 Ibid, paras. 21-37. 
70 Ibid, paras. 45-48. 
71 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Egypt, 5 February 2010, 
CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7, para. 21. 
72 Ibid, para. 24. 
73 Ibid, para. 41. 
74 Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by Egypt (Bayefsky database) 
<www.bayefsky.com/pdf/egypt_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 9 March 2018. 
75 CEDAW see note 4, art. 28.2. 
76 Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by Germany (Bayefsky 
database) <www.bayefsky.com/pdf/germany_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 9 March 2018; 
Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by the Netherlands (Bayefsky 
database) <www.bayefsky.com/pdf/netherlands_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 9 March 2018.  
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children in Germany in conformity with the articles of the Convention’77. This 
disapproval is one of the consequences of making reservations which are considered 
to be contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. 
Every individual has a right to culture, but it cannot supersede the rights of women 
and girls to be free from discrimination and violence. In fact, ‘no social group has 
suffered greater violation of its human rights in the name of culture than women’78. 
For this reason, it is important to listen to cultural relativism arguments with 
skepticism79, and ask what is the status of the speaker, in whose name is the 
argument being advanced, and what is the degree of participation in culture 
formation of the social groups affected80. Above all, culture is not static, so it is 
always bound to change81. 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA)82 adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights on June 1993, is in line with the arguments set out 
above. According to this document, which upholds the principles of the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights83, ‘human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’84, and ‘while the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’85. Therefore, it can be argued that those States parties 
which have entered reservations that challenge the central principles of CEDAW 
are, in effect, violating general international law86, as they are not only contrary to 
                                                          
77 Reservations, declarations, objections and derogations to CEDAW by Germany (Bayefsky 
database) <www.bayefsky.com/pdf/germany_t2_cedaw.pdf> accessed 9 March 2018. 
78 Arati Rao and others, Women’s rights, human rights; International feminist perspectives 
(Routledge 1995) 169.  
79 Ibid, 171. 
80 Ibid, 168. 
81 Ibid, 173. 
82 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, 
A/CONF.157/23. 
83 Ibid, 5. 
84 Ibid, 20. 
85 Ibid, 20. 
86 UN Women website, Reservations to CEDAW 
<www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm> accessed 11 March 2018. 
18 
 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the VDPA, but also to customary 
international law. 
As the VDPA points out, ways and means of addressing the particularly large 
number of impermissible reservations to the Convention should be encouraged87. 
For now, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is 
the responsible body for reviewing reservations88, but further mechanisms have 
been proven to be required in the light of the slow progress that States are making 
on withdrawing reservations. Above all, ‘ratification of CEDAW is supposed to 
improve women’s rights across the board’89, and not to show an apparent image of 
commitment towards human rights while professing no intention to significantly 
implement them90. A more binding control on reservations would be useful in this 
respect. 
The huge amount of reservations made by States parties to CEDAW makes its 
obligations seem less binding than those under other human rights treaties, and in 
turn limits women’s de facto enjoyment of their rights.  
                                                          
87 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action see note 82, 38. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Linda M. Keller, ‘The impact of States parties’ reservations to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ (2014) Michigan State Law Review 325. 
90 Ibid, 326. 
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V. PROPOSALS FOR ENSURING DE FACTO ENJOYMENT OF 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Fifty years ago, the Proclamation of Tehran adopted by the International 
Conference on Human Rights in 1968 noted that although the UN had made 
substantial progress in defining standards for the enjoyment and protection of 
human rights and had adopted many important international instruments, much 
remained to be done in regard to the implementation of those rights91. Almost two 
decades later, the World Conference on Human Rights reiterated that concern in the 
VDPA92. Unfortunately, at the present time many would argue that the international 
system is still lacking in implementation93. 
Certainly, States play a primary role on ensuring implementation of women’s rights, 
but when they show little intention to achieve de facto equality between men and 
women, International Law must intervene94. However, as human rights history has 
confirmed, new and effective methods are needed. The following pages develop 
four proposals that would contribute towards the goal of implementation. 
Proposal 1: Increased coordination among UN organs 
One of the main problems of the UN human rights system is the absence of an 
effective coordination between the different Committees and the wide range of sub-
organs that have been created as a result of the increasing codification of standards 
in international instruments. While the existence of several international organs 
which seek to enforce human rights is undoubtedly positive, it can also cause 
confusion to States as many treaty-monitoring bodies have concurrent 
jurisdiction95. Accordingly, the VDPA urged all UN organs, bodies and specialized 
agencies whose activities deal with human rights ‘to cooperate in order to 
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strengthen, rationalize and streamline their activities, taking into account the need 
to avoid unnecessary duplication’96. 
The idea set out above, when applied to the human rights of women, means that 
steps should be taken to increase cooperation between organs such as the 
Commission on the Status of Women, the CEDAW Committee, the Working Group 
on the issue of Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice, the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, or the United Nations Entity for Gender 
Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), among others97. This 
way, the specialist organizations would have a greater role to play. For instance, the 
CEDAW Committee’s representatives could sit in meetings of the Commission on 
the Status of Women, or entities like UN Women could be invited to provide oral 
information to the CEDAW Committee before it considers a periodic report of a 
particular State98. In this case, UN Women’s feedback would be beneficial to the 
CEDAW Committee since it would be able to elaborate its concluding observations 
with specific ‘on the ground’ information99. Another initiative is to encourage 
interagency mobility, a way to increase awareness of personnel who work in these 
institutions100. 
This cooperation should also be applied between organs which protect human rights 
in a more generic way and the aforementioned ones. In this respect, a prime example 
of a UN agency that works to promote and protect all human rights is the 
OHCHR101. According to its Action Plan, if the OHCHR takes a more proactive 
and engaged role with the UN organs that promote women’s rights and works more 
closely with them, implementation gaps are more likely to be addressed102. 
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Finally, there should be a third level of cooperation between the treaty monitoring 
bodies of the other eight core international human rights treaties and the CEDAW 
Committee. For example, the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protect various rights, but also recognize the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all rights set forth in both 
documents103. This fact generates that the provisions of the Covenants overlap with 
what is stated by CEDAW, and therefore that the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the CEDAW Committee 
have to monitor the implementation of similar rights regarding women. As a result, 
there is a risk of States receiving slightly conflicting messages in the concluding 
observations that all these three bodies issue104. Increased cooperation between 
treaty body chairpersons would ameliorate this problem, and one way to do so is by 
sitting a member of one treaty-monitoring body as an observer on other treaty-
monitoring bodies105. 
Proposal 2: Increased coordination between UN organs and NGOs 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in the promotion 
and protection of human rights, and due to this fact their coordination with UN 
organs is essential to ensure that the existing laws and standards on equality 
between men and women are effectively implemented in practice (de facto)106.  
On the one hand, NGOs’ collaboration would be particularly useful when States 
doesn’t submit their reports on time, as NGO reports could inform the work of the 
UN body involved and help it issue its comments107. This is the case of the 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which have issued comments 
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based on information submitted by NGOs and specialized UN agencies in the face 
of non-submission of reports108. On the other hand, NGO’s collaboration with UN 
bodies would be equally relevant when States submit their reports, because NGOs 
could simultaneously submit observations. Thus, States would be ‘more honest and 
open about problems encountered in the knowledge that the monitoring body will 
also be receiving full reports from NGOs’109.  
Proposal 3: Increased coordination between UN organs and national 
institutions 
The Paris Principles establish that national human rights institutions have the 
responsibility to cooperate with the UN in the protection and promotion of human 
rights110. Among their functions, this kind of institutions publicly advocate for 
human rights, monitor their implementation within a specific State and consider 
complaints made by direct or indirect victims of human rights violations111. This 
means that they can directly interact with civil society and have a first-hand 
knowledge of the State’s human rights situation. Therefore, their coordination with 
UN organs must be considered key to ensure implementation of women’s rights. In 
order for this coordination to be successful, both sides should exchange information 
and experiences; this could be done by convening periodic meetings with 
representatives of national institutions under the auspices of the UN organ 
concerned112. 
Proposal 4: Dialogue and engagement with governments through UN 
organs, NGOs and national institutions 
The three cooperation proposals set out above are crucial to combat discrimination 
against women in practice, but it must be noted that responsibilities falling on UN 
organs, NGOs and national institutions are secondary to the primary role of the 
                                                          
108 Ibid, 166. 
109 Ibid. 
110 UN General Assembly, Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris 
Principles), 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/134, para. 3.(e). 
111 Smith see note 6, 392. 
112 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action see note 82, 46. 
23 
 
State113. In other words, ‘it is mainly through action at the national level that 
international human rights obligations can be translated into reality’114. 
Implementation, therefore, requires first and foremost dialogue and engagement 
with governments. However, working closely with governments can be a difficult 
goal to achieve which will require UN organs, NGOs and national institutions to 
actively cooperate with each other115. 
UN organs, NGOs and national institutions are responsible for assisting the 
government to promote women’s human rights116 and to prevent, investigate and 
punish discrimination117. Nevertheless, sometimes States are reluctant to comply 
with their obligations under International Law and, consequently, to accept any help 
in this regard. It is clear that political will cannot be changed by law alone118, but 
in the 21st century, when economic development is a primary goal for governments, 
a strong argument to make them change their minds is that gender equality is a 
necessary foundation for a prosperous State119. In fact, the UN Sustainable 
Development Goal 5 indicates that ‘investing in education programmes for girls 
and increasing the age at which they marry can return $5 for every dollar spent [and 
that] investing in programmes improving income-generating activities for women 
can return $7 dollars for every dollar spent’120. 
Another way of influencing governments to cooperate is by global opinion. Global 
opinion has been proven to be an important factor for States when deciding to ratify 
human rights instruments121. Examples in this respect are the cases of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and CEDAW; both with almost universal 
ratification122. Conversely, the Migrant Workers Convention took thirteen years 
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from adoption to entry into force123. However, in the particular case of CEDAW 
only half of its States parties have ratified the Optional Protocol124, and there are 
notorious problems of implementation of its rights in almost every State party. For 
this reason, global opinion should evolve so that governments step forward for the 
benefit of women and agree to cooperate with UN organs, NGOs and national 
institutions to achieve implementation. 
Once the government has shown its receptiveness to start an effective cooperation 
with the UN organs, NGOs and national institutions involved, they can start 
proposing the range of tools they have at their disposal125. UN organs can help 
governments to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in practice 
through technical cooperation, policy advice, cooperation in the process of 
reporting126, follow-up procedures after receiving recommendations of UN treaty 
bodies127 and a stronger and sustained presence in the State128. A practical example 
of this cooperation could be to provide model laws to States in order to incorporate 
CEDAW effectively into domestic law; this way the Convention will stand a much 
greater chance of being enforced129. 
NGOs and national institutions also have an important role to play in collaborating 
with States parties to CEDAW. As Yakin Ertürk noted, ex-Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, NGOs have the responsibility to engage in a ‘cultural 
negotiation’ with community leaders, including religious leaders, in order to 
demonstrate the compatibility of culture and religion with the universal rights of 
women130. This could be achieved by understanding the root causes of violence, 
and proposing alternative practices and expressions of masculinity that are 
respectful of women’s rights, as well as explaining the dangers that some traditional 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 The OHCHR Plan of Action: Protection and Empowerment see note 102, para. 47. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Smith see note 6, 391. 
128 The OHCHR Plan of Action: Protection and Empowerment see note 102, para. 52. 
129 Smith see note 6, 175. 
130 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its causes and Consequences: Towards an effective implementation of international norms 
to end violence against women, 26 December 2003, E/CN.4/2004/66, para. 55. 
25 
 
practices entail for women’s health131. Regarding national institutions, the Paris 
Principles state that they are responsible for contributing ‘to the reports which 
States are required to submit to UN bodies and committees’132, and submitting to 
the government, Parliament or any other body of the State opinions, 
recommendations, proposals and reports ‘on any matters concerning the promotion 
and protection of human rights’133.  
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For the reasons set out in this paper, the conclusion reached is that, although the 
needs of women are generally adequately addressed in law (de jure), there are 
serious problems regarding the implementation of their rights (de facto). 
CEDAW, the Committee, the General Recommendations, and the Special 
Rapporteur are all evidence that at the normative level there are lots of protections 
available. However, the enforcement mechanisms do not work as well as predicted, 
and are the first sign of the existing limits for the implementation of women’s rights. 
The reporting procedure has been proved ineffective to provide proper solutions in 
practice, the interstate procedure has never been used, the inquiry procedure has 
just been used once, and the individual complaints procedure is underutilized for 
the lack of awareness of this mechanism by the victims or their relatives. 
In addition, although there is evidence that gender-based violence is not only 
exercised in the public sphere but also in the domestic sphere, States continue using 
the public/private division as a justification for not taking appropriate measures to 
prevent, investigate and punish this kind of acts in accordance with the due 
diligence standard. The rationale behind these sort of arguments is that States want 
to preserve their sovereignty from International Law. Moreover, another 
impediment for women’s de facto enjoyment of their rights is cultural relativism, 
which is the main reason for reservations. 
International Law is based on consent, so it is improbable that the international legal 
framework on women’s rights become more binding unless States agree to it. 
However, there are still measures available in order to grant the practical realization 
of gender equality and the eradication of violence towards women. Examples of 
these measures are the four proposals which have been developed in this paper: 1) 
increased coordination among UN organs, 2) increased coordination between UN 
organs and NGOs, 3) increased coordination between UN organs and national 
institutions and 4) dialogue and engagement with governments through UN organs, 
NGOs and national institutions. 
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On balance, there has been progress over the years regarding equality between men 
and women but far more remains to be achieved. The practical realization of the 
elimination of discrimination against women remains, for many individuals, an 
aspiration134. The key is to continue working in order to translate principle into 
practice, because gender equality is a necessary foundation for a peaceful, 
prosperous and sustainable world135.  
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